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Regional Governors Navigating through Putin’s 
Third Term  
On the Wave of Patriotism through the Troubled Waters of the Economy   
Gulnaz Sharafutdinova 
King’s College London 
Gulnaz.Sharafutdinova@kcl.ac.uk 
Abstract  
This study focuses on the regional effects of new domestic and foreign policies initi-
ated by Russia’s president and the challenging policy dilemmas faced by regional gov-
ernors since 2012. It analyzes gubernatorial elections held during 2012-2015 to show 
the increased control over the electoral process and the regional cadre exercised by 
the Kremlin. It explores the implications of new identity politics and foreign policies 
advanced from Moscow on regional elites’ place in Russia’s system of power, their gov-
ernance strategies and political economies. It reviews regional adjustment strategies 
undertaken in response to Russia’s rising economic problems.  
Keywords  
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A high degree of political centralization and personalized presidential power 
base notwithstanding, Russia’s authoritarian political system depends on its 
elites’ loyalty, competence, and ability to deliver political and social stability 
to the regime. Responsible for maintaining social, economic and political sta-
bility in the regions, regional elites and governors in particular play a crucial 
role in maintaining the national status-quo. Hence, the Kremlin’s attention to 
perfecting the policy tools and institutional mechanisms for ensuring its influ-
ence in the regions, for integrating regional political systems in the nationally 
controlled system of governance, and incentivizing regional elites to support 
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the regime has not diminished in the last two decades associated with Vladi-
mir Putin’s presidency in Russia. The key outlines of center-regional relations 
characterizing Russia’s system of governance emerged in the early 2000s as a 
result of the centralization drive – political, fiscal and administrative – that 
recalibrated the system to make it more ‘manageable’ and responsive to fed-
eral policies, interests and initiatives.1 Substantive institutional changes that 
have occurred since, in the electoral and party system as well as the system of 
gubernatorial selection, have sought to maximize two goals - political legiti-
macy of the system on one hand and the imperative of control, the main logic 
underlying the system, on the other.2  
Though center-regional relations in Russia have overall kept their existing 
contours in the last decade and a half, politics and economics in the regions as 
well as the position of regional governors themselves have been strongly af-
fected by the changing national political landscape. The political strategy ad-
vanced to fix ‘the cracks in the wall’ of Putin’s regime manifested in 2011-2012 
protests3 meant an overhaul of the system of political legitimation in Russia as 
reflected in the shift from mostly pragmatic to value-driven, symbolic politics 
focused on culture, identity and values and aimed at national consolidation 
based on traditional values and the promotion of patriotism. The identity pol-
itics manipulating and intensifying the feelings of national ressentiment 
among the Russian public have evolved in parallel with the growing personifi-
cation of power in Russia.4 Such evolution had an effect, direct and indirect, 
 
1 On early stages of reforms, see Peter Reddaway and Robert W. Orttung, Dynamics of Russian 
politics: Putin's reform of federal-regional relations. Vols.1-2 (Rowman & Littlefield, 2004-
2005); Cameron Ross, "Federalism and electoral authoritarianism under Putin," Demo-
kratizatsiya 13, no.3 (2005): 347-372. 
2 For the discussion of these two goals in relation to the return of gubernatorial elections in 2011, 
see Helge Blakkisrud, “Governing the governors: legitimacy vs. control in the reform of 
the Russian regional executive," East European Politics 31, no. 1 (2015): 104-121. 
3 Nikolay Petrov, Maria Lipman, and Henry E. Hale, "Three dilemmas of hybrid regime govern-
ance: Russia from Putin to Putin," Post-Soviet Affairs 30, no.1 (2014): 1-26; Vladimir 
Gel’man, "Cracks in the Wall: Challenges to Electoral Authoritarianism in Russia," Prob-
lems of Post-Communism 60, no.2 (2013): 3-10; Ivan Krastev and Stephen Holmes, "An Au-
topsy of Managed Democracy." Journal of Democracy 23, no.3 (2012): 33-45. 
4 Regina Smyth and Irina Soboleva, "Looking beyond the economy: Pussy Riot and the Kremlin's 
voting coalition," Post-Soviet Affairs 30, no.4 (2014): 257-275. 
Gulnaz Sharafutdinova, “Managing National Ressentiment: Morality Politics in Putin’s Russia,” 
in Vocabularies of International Relations After Crisis in Ukraine, ed. by Andrey Makary-
chev and Aleksandra Yatsyk (Ashgate, forthcoming 2016). 
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on governance patterns and practices in Russia, influencing politics in the re-
gions as well.  
The new domestic politics went hand in hand with Russia’s more aggressive 
foreign policies reflected in Russia’s actions in Ukraine and Syria as well as vis-
à-vis Turkey and the Western countries.5 The ensuing deterioration of eco-
nomic conditions resulting not only from economic sanctions imposed by the 
West and Russia’s own anti-western sanctions but from other, more structural 
factors, such as weak oil prices, have imposed new challenges on regional 
elites most of which are constraining from the regional perspective. Further-
more, Putin’s foreign policy initiatives had various local spillovers that re-
gional governments had to address. In the end, though governors benefitted 
politically from the patriotic euphoria in the country that ensued after Crimea 
annexation and ran highly successful electoral campaigns in the regions in 
2014-2015, their place in the new system of power became more vulnerable. 
With the growing personalization of central power and the loss of popular 
base, governors along with other regional officials became prime objects for 
anti-corruption campaigns waged from Moscow to increase regime’s legiti-
macy. Additionally, in the context of economic troubles and diminished re-
sources coming from the federal center combined with the new financial bur-
dens of populist May 2012 presidential decrees, the governors have been hard 
pressed from the bottom by growing incidents of regional and localized pro-
tests.  Social destabilization and the pressure from the bottom is only likely to 
increase further as economic stagnation in Russia continues and the governors 
turn to social spending cuts as a preferred mode of responding to financial 
pressures. 
Providing an overview of main political trends in center-regional relations 
in Russia in the last few years, this article focuses particularly on the regional 
effects of new domestic and foreign policies initiated by Russia’s president 
since 2012. The first part analyzes the results of gubernatorial elections in 2012-
2015 and demonstrates the enhancement of ‘control’ by the Kremlin over the 
regional cadres. It also explores the implications of Putin’s new symbolic poli-
tics on regional elites and regional policies. The second part reviews the re-
gional effects of Putin’s foreign policies and regional and federal response to 
problems that have emerged as a result of these policies. The third part delves 
into the deepening economic and financial problems in Russia focusing on 
 
5 Andrei Tsygankov, "Vladimir Putin's last stand: the sources of Russia's Ukraine policy," Post-
Soviet Affairs 31, no.4 (2015): 279-303; Robert Nalbandov, Not by Bread Alone: Russian For-
eign Policy Under Putin (University of Nebraska Press, 2016). 
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various adjustment strategies undertaken by regional governments in re-
sponse. The concluding section revisits central observations regarding re-
gional governors standing in Russia’s political system and the broader impli-
cations of the observed changes for Russia’s political system.  
Putin’s New Domestic Politics: Its Meaning and Implications for 
Russia’s Regional Elites 
The evolution of Russia’s ‘electoral authoritarian’ political system associated 
in the last decade and a half with Vladimir Putin has gone through several de-
velopmental stages.6 The construction of regime’s main pillars corresponds to 
Putin’s first term in power but critical adjustments were made during his sec-
ond term in 2004-2008, when regime consolidated.7 A string of superficial re-
forms undertaken during Dmitry Medvedev’s presidency in 2008-2012 did not 
change the system and its institutions even though Medvedev’s moderniza-
tion rhetoric instilled expectations of political liberalization and, arguably, 
was an important pre-condition for 2011-2012 protests.8 Political reforms ad-
vanced in response to these protests opened a new stage of regime conserva-
tion. The new symbolic politics of regime legitimation emphasizing traditional 
values, morality and patriotism, aggressive foreign policy and securitization of 
domestic discourse infused with intense anti-American and anti-Western 
propaganda are the main pillars of this new stage. This new politics found an 
intense resonance in the Russian public increasing Putin’s popularity and 
heightening personalization of power in Russia.9 The effects of these develop-
ments on regional elites are more debatable. 
 
6 For the discussion of Russian politics through the prism of electoral authoritarianism, see for 
example, Grigory Golosov, “The Regional Roots of Electoral Authoritarianism in Russia,” 
Europe-Asia Studies 63, No.4 (2011): 623–639; Ross 2005.  
7 The abolishing of gubernatorial elections, for example, occurred at the beginning of Putin’s 
second term; it was evident though that this reform was prepared in advance and Putin 
just made use of the tragedy in Beslan to announce this reform. 
8 For related arguments see Kirill Rogov,  “Osnovnye tendentsii politicheskogo razvitiia Rossii v 
2011-2013 gg.” Analytical report (2014). Accessed at: http://liberal.ru/upload/files/Osnov-
nie%20tendentsii%20politicheskogo%20razvitiya.pdf; Denis Volkov, "The protesters 
and the public," Journal of Democracy 23, no.3 (2012): 55-62. 
9 For further analysis on how hybrid regimes’ dealing with political challenges produces further 
personalization of power, see Petrov, Lipman and Hale 2014.  
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First, the trend of governors’ losing popular base in their regions has further 
continued. This trend was introduced as an essential element of Putin’s re-
forms that sought to integrate governors into a unified administrative hierar-
chy and culminated in ending gubernatorial elections in 2004. The enhance-
ment of Putin’s personal influence in reaction to his foreign policy actions and 
his acquisition of the status of a ‘great leader’ (vozhd’) in the aftermath of Cri-
mea annexation further eroded the position of regional governors within the 
system.10 The system relying on the legitimacy of the ‘great leader’ does not 
require other leaders connecting with the populace.11 If genuinely popular 
and uncontrolled, they actually represent a political threat to the center. 
Therefore, the Kremlin’s decision to return gubernatorial elections in response 
to 2011-2012 protests was accompanied by such conditions (the so called ‘fil-
ters’) that allowed for a fully controlled electoral process with undesirable can-
didates (sometimes those, with a genuine chance for victory) excluded from 
the race. Specifically, the municipal filter required a gubernatorial candidate 
to get signatures of a specified number of municipal legislators (anywhere be-
tween 5 and 10%, depending on the region) for registering to run in the elec-
tions. This condition turned into the main mechanism for weeding out un-
wanted candidates from gubernatorial elections.12 Further amendment of this 
law signed by Putin in 2013 allowed regions to forego elections altogether and 
have the regional legislature select the governor from the list approved by the 
president. Most regions in the North Caucasus as well as energy-rich Yamalo-
Nenets, Khanty-Mansi and Nenets autonomous okrugs, Crimea and Sevasto-
pol have since opted for this system of legislative appointment of regional gov-
ernors.  
As the data on gubernatorial elections in table 1 indicate (see Appendix), 
the four rounds of elections held in 2012-2015 revealed the extent to which es-
tablishment controls effectively produce electoral victories. All but one guber-
natorial election held during 2012-2015 resulted in the victory of a non-incum-
bent in the second round of the election. Prior to pilot 2012 electoral season, 
the Kremlin used the previous system of appointments to replace governors 
 
10 For an interpretations of Putin’s influence as a military vozhd’, see interview with Nikolai Pe-
trov, at http://www.svoboda.org/a/26539151.html 
11 Maria Lipman and Nikolai Petrov, “2015: Zavershenie perekhoda ot ‘miagkogo 
avtoritarizma’ k bole zhestkomu,” Kontrapunkt  #4, June 2016. 
12 Blakkisrud 2015, 106-107 
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en masse, removing fourteen regional leaders deemed unpopular and incapa-
ble of being reelected from their posts. Only five gubernatorial elections were 
held in this electoral season, arguably, in the regions expected to produce an-
ticipated results. Eight elections were held in 2013, twenty nine in 2014 and 
twenty one in 2015. Many governors went through early resignations in 2014 in 
order to use the patriotic momentum associated with Crimea annexation 
(‘krymnash’ effect) and get reelected before the negative impact of Western 
(and anti-Western) economic sanctions were felt in the regions.13 This strategy 
proved successful and in many cases the incumbents won with high margins, 
facing no real competition (see Appendix). Thus, the governors who ran in 
2012 elections won with an average of 72% support, 2013 cohort won with 68%, 
2014 with 77%, and 2015 with 72%. Evidently, running for gubernatorial seat 
in 2014, when pollsters registered a record high sense of social well-being 
among the population in terms of life satisfaction, material well-being, and so-
cial optimism was favorable for the incumbents.14 Putin’s popularity ratings, 
for example, soared from 53% in 2013 to 83% a year later.15 Governors running 
in 2014 could also ride on this national patriotic euphoria. This sense of pride 
and euphoria following the annexation of Crimea lessened in 2015, which was 
reflected, among other things, in a drop of the average vote received by gover-
nors who ran in 2015. 
As a rule, the incumbents were affiliated with United Russia (UR), a party 
of power that has become an essential pillar of Putin’s regime.16 In few cases 
when the incumbents ran under different party affiliations (LDPR, KPRF or 
Just Russia), it was done based on the approval from the Kremlin. The UR re-
gional branch in those cases did not advance their own candidates. Further-
more, these few governors that were affiliated with other parties, such as Smo-
lensk governor Ostrovskii affiliated with LDPR and Orel governor Potomskii 
affiliated with KPRF have demonstrated, once in power, a tendency to build 
 
13 On post-Crimea syndrome referred to widely as ‘krymnash’ read, for example, “Golovokru-
zhenie ot uspekhov.” Lenta.ru, 2015. Accessed at: lenta.ru/articles/2015/12/02/krym/ 
14 Anastasia Novak, “Ekspertiza: Rossiane na pod’eme,” Polit.ru, 19 August 2014. Accessed at: 
polit.ru/article/2014/08/19/rise1/ 
15 Julie Ray and Neli Esipova, “Russian Approval of Putin Soars to Highest Level in Years,” 2014. 
Accessed at: www.gallup.com/poll/173597/russian-approval-putin-soars-highest-level-
years.aspx 
16 On the incorporation of regional governors into United Russia, see Golosov 2011, Ora John 
Reuter, "The politics of dominant party formation: United Russia and Russia's governors," 
Europe-Asia Studies 62, no.2 (2010): 293-327. 
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amicable, working relations with UR and distance themselves somewhat from 
their own party.17  
The only exceptional case when the incumbent ended up losing to the op-
position candidate was that of Irkutsk oblast where, in 2015, the Communist 
candidate Sergei Levchenko won in the second round of election over the in-
cumbent governor Yeroshchenko, supported by United Russia. As opposed to 
other non-UR affiliated governors, Levchenko stayed accountable to the coa-
lition that brought him to power; such situation however resulted in a recent 
municipal ‘revolt’ as the mayors of cities in Irkutsk oblast affiliated with United 
Russia started a coordinated campaign criticizing the regional authorities.18  
This difference in non-UR governors’ strategies of dealing with the party of 
power in their regions is arguably a product of how they came to power in the 
first place. Ostrovskii and Potomskii were ‘cleared’ from the Kremlin; there-
fore, both sides, including the regional branch of the party of power and the 
new governor himself, were incentivized to cooperate. Levchenko was elected 
against the Kremlin’s will. The regional representatives of the party of power 
were therefore driven by the incentive to undermine Levchenko and destabi-
lize his position and authority in the region. 
Overall, these four rounds of gubernatorial elections have demonstrated 
that the incumbents have exercised an overwhelming control over the elec-
toral process in the regions mostly by managing the entry into the gubernato-
rial race. Electoral results have become highly predictable, resembling the So-
viet political model, albeit with multiple candidates participating in the elec-
tions. Cases of inter-elite rivalries and disagreements in the regions are largely 
resolved prior to elections, unofficially, with the assistance from the presiden-
tial administration. The case with Vadim Potomskii, who ran for governorship 
backed by the KPRF in Briansk and was able to seriously challenge the incum-
bent Nikolai Denin, is illustrative. Although Denin won the election in Briansk, 
Potomskii was later appointed by Putin an interim governor in Orel oblast and 
then won elections there in 2015.  
Following the national model of controlled elections used as a ritual for po-
litical legitimation, regional elections have also turned primarily into the 
 
17 “Guberantory-oppozitsionery i ikh regiony: Spetsifika kampanii-2016,” analytical report pre-
pared by APEC (the Agency for Political and Economic Communications). Accessed at: 
www.apecom.ru/projects/item.php?SECTION_ID=91&ELEMENT_ID=3007  
18 Andrei Vinokurov, “Irkutskoe vosstanie merov,” Gazeta.ru, 29 August 2016. Accessed at: 
www.gazeta.ru/politics/2016/08/29_a_10165115.shtml 
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mechanism for the legitimization of regional authorities rather than creating 
a popularly supported regional leadership through the process of free and fair 
contestation. In some regions such as Tatarstan and Kemerovo oblast, where 
regional leaders exercise tight control over regional political space, such 
tendencies of ritualized elections have existed since the 1990s.19 Since 2012 this 
model of controlled elections with certain results has spread practically to all 
of Russia’s regions. The main difference with the 1990s though is the role of the 
federal center that is now closely involved in the regional cadre selection and 
has instituted new rules that ensure predictability in the electoral process. The 
leadership skills necessary for building controlled political spaces in the 1990s 
are not required in the present system but the Kremlin support is imperative. 
The weakening of the status and significance of gubernatorial elections is a 
direct consequence of these developments. Both popular reaction and the 
Kremlin’s own actions are indicative. From the standpoint of regional popula-
tion, the devaluation of elections is clearly manifested in lower voting turn-
outs.20 The federal center, in its turn, demonstrates a certain degree of disre-
gard towards the electoral results when it pressures the elected governors to 
resign.21 Not surprisingly therefore regional governors have turned into ‘trans-
mission belts’ responding to incentives from the federal center and imple-
menting federal policies in the localities. During the period of economic 
growth in the 2000s, the federal center could direct policy-making in the re-
gions through the system of federal transfers incentivizing regional governors 
to initiate and participate in various infrastructure-development projects, pro-
mote agricultural and small-business development, and even invent regional 
mega-projects and events aimed at bringing federal resources into the re-
gion.22 Russia’s rising economic problems have resulted in a drastic reduction 
 
19 On Tatarstan, see Gulnaz Sharafutdinova, Political consequences of crony capitalism inside 
Russia (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 2010). On Kemerovo oblast, see 
Robert W. Orttung, Danielle N. Lussier, and Anna Paretskaya. The republics and regions 
of the Russian federation: A guide to politics, policies, and leaders (ME Sharpe, 2000), 211-
218. 
20 Rostislav Turovsky, “Systemic Opposition at Russia’s Gubernatorial Elections,” Basic Research 
Program Working Papers, WP BRP26/PS/2015.  
HSE, 6. 
21 As happened with Konstantin Il’kovskii, governor of Zabaikal’skii krai, who was elected in 
2013 but stepped down in February 2016, evidently under the Kremlin’s suggestion.  
22 Gulnaz Sharafutdinova and Rostislav Turovsky, "The politics of federal transfers in Putin’s 
Russia: regional competition, lobbying, and federal priorities," Post-Soviet Affairs (2016): 
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of the flow of money from Moscow into the regions. Nonetheless, the gover-
nors still have to find the ways to maintain economic and social stability in 
their regions and respond to policy initiatives originating in Moscow. The re-
cent shift in national rhetoric towards identity issues and the transformation 
of the domestic political landscape with an enhanced role of the national 
leader have found their reflection in the regions as well.    
The way regional governors have appropriated Putin’s new, value-driven 
politics are indicative of the lack of autonomous policy-making space in the 
regions. In the atmosphere of national consolidation and rallying around the 
flag, as experienced in the aftermath of Crimea annexation, regional elites had 
to fall in line with the ideological message advanced by the Kremlin. For ex-
ample, the Kremlin requested that the regional authorities design programs 
for patriotic education in their regions and ensure the implementation of their 
programs.23 Regional activities in this sphere have since expanded at a quick 
pace: eighty regions have created interdepartmental coordinating councils on 
patriotic education, seventy four regions have created centers for patriotic ed-
ucation and five regions have even adopted laws on patriotic bringing up of 
Russian citizens.24 Governors also advance their own ‘patriotic’ initiatives 
such as the infamous monument to the Russian tsar Ivan the Terrible that Va-
dim Potomskii (governor of Orel region) plans to erect in his region.25 Ironi-
cally, Orel region does not have any specific ties to Ivan the Terrible. Rather, 
Potomskii’s initiative appeals to patriotic, state-oriented electorate and re-
flects the resurgence of the images of such powerful and autocratic leaders as 
Ivan the Terrible, Peter the Great, and Joseph Stalin.  
Admittedly, social stability in the region remains the key expectation and 
assessment criteria for the governors along with the electoral results. The 
Kremlin wants the governors to exert control over their regional populations 
 
1-15. 
23 “Regiony razrabatyvaiut plany patrioticheskogo vospitaniia.”  19 April 2016. Accessed at: 
er.ru/news/141421/ 
24 “Opyt sub’ektov Rossiiskoi Federatsii po voenno-patrioticheskomu vospitaniiu molodezhi.” 
Accessed at: council.gov.ru/activity/activities/roundtables/56831/ 
25 Potomskii was ridiculed for his historical ignorance when he suggested that Ivan the Terrible 
(who died in 1584) traveled with his son from Moscow to St. Petersburg (founded in 1703). 
See “Orlovskii gubernator: Ivan Groznii ekhal s synom v Peterburg,” Radio Svoboda. Ac-
cessed at: www.svoboda.org/a/27872019.html  
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and ensure electoral turnout and vote for the party of power.26 In the new con-
ditions of economic stagnation and ‘belt tightening’ this expectation also 
means that governors have to deal with increased local protests and social ac-
tions in response to unpaid salaries, rising utility bills, defaulted home inves-
tors (dol’shchiki) and other economic troubles.27   
The way governors respond to public demands, how they speak to the pop-
ulation, how they manage public opinion becomes ever more important in re-
vealing the managerial skills of the Kremlin’s ‘agents’ in the regions. The Krem-
lin-controlled system of regional cadre management and specifically the prac-
tice of power rotation (one of the foundations of the Soviet cadre development 
system) increasingly used for gubernatorial positions do not seem to produce 
the expected results, however. Recent incidents in Samara oblast provide a 
good example of problems at hand. 
Merkushkin, an ex-governor of Mordovia, has been appointed the governor 
of Samara in 2012. He was successful in constructing a highly centralized and 
controlled system of governance in Mordovia and build constructive relations 
with the federal center as reflected in the flow of federal transfers into this re-
public.28 His governorship in Samara, however, has been marred by numerous 
scandals with the most recent one, in August 2016, following his response on 
the issue of unpaid salaries at AvtoVAZ that amounted to an accusation of the 
woman asking a question of being prompted to do that by the US ambassador 
who visited the region in spring 2016. A little earlier, at a meeting with regional 
voters in July 2016, Merkushkin suggested that the CIA plot against Russia has 
been piloted at Samara region because the region has always been the main 
training ground for Western experiments.29 The petition asking for Merkush-
kin’s psychological assessment on change.org and the public outcry against his 
inadequacy in the media reflect that his leadership in Samara is highly prob-
lematic and represents a liability for the Kremlin.  
 
26 Michael Rochlitz, “Political Loyalty vs. Economic Performance: Evidence from Machine Poli-
tics in Russia’s Regions,” WP BRP 34/PS/2016, HSE; Ora John Reuter and Graeme B. Rob-
ertson. "Subnational appointments in authoritarian regimes: Evidence from Russian gu-
bernatorial appointments." The Journal of Politics 74, no. 4, (2012): 1023-1037. 
27 On increasing labor strikes in Russian regions, see Stephen Crowley and Irina Olimpieva. 
“Russian Labor Protest in Challenging Economic Times,” Russian Analytical Digest #182, 
20 April 2016. On protest trends, see Tomila Lankina and Alisa Voznaya, “New data on 
protest trends in Russia's regions,” Europe-Asia Studies 67, no.2, (2015): 327-342. 
28 His lobbying capacities have been noted in various rankings of Russia’s governors.  
29 “Gubernator Nikolai Merkushkin razoblachil zagovor TsRU protiv Samarskoi oblasti,” 14 Au-
gust 2016. Accessed at: www.ixtc.org/2016/08/gubernator-nikolay-merkushkin-razobla-
chil-zagovor-tsru-protiv-samarskoy-oblasti/ 
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 The case of governor Merkushkin turning from a successful leader of Mor-
dovia into an inadequate governor of Samara is a good illustration of the re-
gional economic and social differentiation that has occurred in Russia over the 
last two decades and a half, resulting in territories with very different social 
and political expectations. Under the leadership of Konstantin Titov, the more 
economically and socially developed Samara region has turned into a more 
advanced space of public interaction between regional authorities and the 
population, than Mordovia, one of the poorest republics in the country gov-
erned in an authoritarian and paternalistic manner. Merkushkin’s leadership 
in Samara reveals that the methods and style of governance that have been 
suitable in Mordovia do not meet the demands in Samara. Even if the Kremlin 
comprehends these changing realities, however, given its prioritization of loy-
alty and control in the short term and the general shortage of regional cadre 
in the existing non-competitive power system constructed by Putin, it simply 
does not have much choice of more suitable candidates for the position. The 
most recent appointments of Putin’s ex-security guard into gubernatorial po-
sitions discussed later in this article are yet another illustration of how scarce 
gubernatorial cadre pool in Russia is.    
Merkushkin’s use of security tropes (i.e. CIA plot enacted against Samara 
region; the role of the US ambassador in inciting regional unrest) is another 
valuable sign of how national-level security-based narrative can get repro-
duced for regional governance purposes. The ‘enemy at the gate’ image-based 
politics ratcheted up on the main television channels in Russia after Crimea 
annexation have been a valuable tool for the federal government and Putin 
personally to legitimize his power and keep public attention away from rising 
domestic economic and social problems. Evidently, regional leaders try to em-
ploy this tool as well. Karelia’s governor Aleksander Khudilaynen, who sug-
gested in summer 2015 that foreign security services have increased their ac-
tivities to destabilize socio-political environment in the region is another ex-
ample of such tactics.30 That both of these regional leaders are in the list of 
problematic governors whose positions are not very stable might be revealing 
of how (un)successful might such security-oriented tactics be on the regional 
level.31 Arguably, the regional population views their governors as regional 
managers (khozyaistvennik) and expects economic and social achievements 
(or at least stability), with security issues left to the federal government. 
 
30 “V Karelii aktivizirovalis’ zabugornye shpiony,” Novye vedomosti, 31 July 2016. Accessed at: 
nvdaily.ru/info/54225.html 
31 Khudilaynen was last in some recent gubernatorial ratings. See Andrei Pertsev, “Aleksander 
Khudilaynen priblizhaetsia k otstavke,” Kommersant, 20 June 2016. Accessed at: kommer-
sant.ru/doc/3017980 
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The new symbolic politics focused on traditional values and Russia’s his-
toric identity initiated by Putin is only one important element of the new pol-
itics of legitimation that has been worked out by the Russian government. An 
intensification of the anti-corruption campaign against various parts of the 
elite appears to be its other intrinsic element. Indeed, it is plausible to expect 
that in the new economic conditions of a shrinking pie, the level of inter-elite 
competition over diminishing resources is likely to increase, while the Krem-
lin’s tolerance for massive corruption characteristic of Russia in the 2000s 
would have to diminish. These two rationales, an inter-elite struggle on the 
one hand and the regime’s lesser tolerance for corruption, on the other, might 
be behind a number of gubernatorial arrests that have occurred recently and 
demonstrated that, despite high levels of control by the incumbent candidates 
reflected in gubernatorial elections, the actual position of regional governors 
in Russia’s political system has clearly weakened.  Specifically, in 2015-2016 the 
governors of Sakhalin, Komi and Kirov regions (Khoroshavin, Gaizer and Be-
lykh), have all been arrested and charged with bribery (in cases of Khoroshavin 
and Belykh) and the misuse of public funds and forming a criminal network to 
plunder the state in case of Gaizer. Most analysts have recognized these inci-
dents to be unprecedented, as previous cases of criminal proceedings against 
governors have normally occurred after the governors were already fired.32  
These arrests fall into a recent pattern of a growing number of high-ranking 
criminal cases that have involved such figures as Russia’s federal customs 
chief, Andrei Belyaninov (reported to be personally close to Putin), deputy 
minister of culture, a former top manager of state company RusHydro, and 
even high-ranking officials from the Investigative Committee. All these cases 
have pointed to a new anti-corruption campaign underway in Russia and have 
demonstrated the activation of law enforcement agencies’ in Russia.  Given 
the dramatic images of detainments, searches, and arrests of high-ranking of-
ficials broadcast on the nightly news on Russia’s major TV channels, it seems 
plausible to interpret this campaign as pursuing several aims. It is, first, a tool 
of political legitimation for Putin as it demonstrates the law enforcement 
agencies going after corrupt state officials. It is, also, a signal to the elite to re-
strain their appetites that have grown exponentially in the ‘fat 2000s’ and are 
unsustainable in the current economic environment. Finally, anti-corruption 
campaigns in Russia have always been a tool used in inter-elite clashes to rid 
of competitors.33 Many of the aforementioned cases have resulted, either from 
 
32 For example, Briansk governor Denin, Novosibirsk governor Yurchenko, and Amur governor 
Korotkov.         
33 Ekaterina Vinokurova, “Chistka klanov,” Gazeta.ru, 28 November, 2012. Accessed at: 
www.gazeta.ru/politics/2012/11/28_a_4871461.shtml 
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the presence of influential competitors that could exert influence and start 
such procedures against their enemies; or alternatively, in the absence of a 
powerful protector that could stop these actions.  
The appointment of security services officers into gubernatorial positions – 
another important recent trend in the Kremlin’s cadre policy – is an additional 
manifestation the importance of anti-corruption campaign as well as the im-
perative of control underlying Russia’s governance system. In July 2016 Putin 
replaced four regional governors (Kaliningrad, Yaroslavl, Kirov and Sevasto-
pol) and reshuffled various other staff at senior positions in the government. 
Two of the new governors are from Federal Security Services (FSB) and Federal 
Protective Services (FSO), including a new governor of Kaliningrad, Evgeny Zi-
nichev, who is a former Putin bodyguard.34  
To summarize, Russia’s evolving domestic political landscape has affected 
the standing of regional governors in the system further eroding their links to 
the regional public and making them more dependent on the federal center. 
While the Kremlin’s support and new institutional rules help the governors to 
get easily reelected, their overall position has weakened considerably. Russia’s 
economic troubles make it hard for the governors to maintain regional eco-
nomic and social stability; meanwhile, the anti-corruption campaign initiated 
from Moscow can be easily directed at specific governors (especially those 
lacking powerful connections in Moscow).  
Putin’s Foreign Policy and Regional Response 
Besides domestic policy repercussions, regions have also experienced serious 
reverberations originating from Russia's foreign policy actions. Russia’s rela-
tions with Ukraine broken irrevocably in the aftermath of Crimea annexation 
have revealed the interdependence of two countries’ military sectors and Rus-
sia’s dependence on Ukrainian production of motors powering the Russian 
helicopters and jets, and engines powering Russia’s naval ships. In summer 
2014 Ukraine’s president Poroshenko officially banned military cooperation 
with Russia. It meant that Russian regions producing helicopters, planes, and 
ships used in the military and relying on essential components from Ukraine 
were hit by the ban.  The production of AN-148/158 aircrafts in Voronezh, 
 
34 Daria Litvinova, “Putin’s Game of Thrones: The Men in Epaulets Take Over,” 
The Moscow Times, July 29, 2016. Accessed at: themoscowtimes.com/arti-
cles/game-of-thrones-russian-regions-and-districts-get-new-leaders-in-epau-
lets-54782 
14 SHARAFUTDINOVA 
RUSSIAN POLITICS 1 (2016) 27 – 53 
equipped by engines made at Ukrainian Motor Sich, and helicopters produced 
at KVZ in Tatarstan, also relying on Motor Sich engines, are just two relevant 
examples of such interdependence. In addition, the Ukrainian plant Yu-
zhmash in Dnipropetrovsk had manufactured rockets and missiles for the Rus-
sian army and Zorya-Mashproekt in Nikolaev produced turbine engines for 
Russian naval ships.35 Dmitry Rogozin, Russia’s deputy prime minister, re-
vealed that Ukrainian components were used in the production of 186 types of 
Russian military equipment.36  
Western sanctions banning the export of military and dual-use technolo-
gies to Russia have further affected Russia’s military industry. The infamous 
Uralvagonzavod, Russia’s main tank producer, that in 2012 played a role of 
Putin’s support base, faced bankruptcy unable to repay billions of rubles to its 
creditor, Alfa bank.37 Given the national-level significance of the military in-
dustry for the economy and for regime support, the regions were not left to 
themselves to solve these problems. In April 2014, the federal government 
quickly initiated a strategy of import-substitution.38  While import substitu-
tion emerged motto of the Russian government over the last two years, a sober 
analysis of results, whether actual or expected, reveal it to be disappointing. 
Russia not only depends on Western imports for specific components for its 
finished products, such as electric equipment or aforementioned engines, it 
also lacks the machines and the equipment needed to produce them in the 
first place. 39     
Russia's reaction to Turkey downing the Russian plane in November 2015 
has presented another significant problem for many regions and Russia’s 
economy more generally. In reaction to this incident, the Kremlin initiated 
harsh economic and diplomatic sanctions that banned Turkish companies 
and citizens from work in Russia; implemented visa regime at the borders, and 
restricted imports to and exports from Russia. These measures increased hard-
ship for all Russian consumers as they included agricultural imports such as 
tomatoes, tangerines and oranges.  Turkey has also been a major destination 
 
35 Charles Recknagel, “Complex Ties: Russia's Armed Forces Depend On Ukraine's Military In-
dustry,” RFE RL, 14 September 2016. Accessed at: www.rferl.org/content/russia-ukraine-
military-equipment/25312911.html; Aleksandr Golts, “Voenno-promyshlennyi gopak,” 
Kommersant, 20 July 2014. Accessed at: kommersant.ru/doc/2497675 
36 Pavel Aksenov, “Ukraine crisis: Why a lack of parts has hamstrung Russia's military,” BBC 
News, 8 August 2015. Accessed at: www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-33822821 
37 “Eksperty: bankrotstvo ‘Uralvagonzavoda’ nevozmozhno..” RIA novosti, 19 May 2016. Accessed 
at: ria.ru/economy/20160519/1436584491.html 
38 Vladimir Voronov, “Importozameshchenie dlia Rogozina,” Inosmi.ru, 10 January 2016. Ac-
cessed at: inosmi.ru/military/20160110/235003214.html 
39 Ibid.  
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for Russian tourists who made use of all-inclusive resorts in Antalyia, Kemer, 
and other places. Still, the patriotic hysteria against Turkey was widespread in 
Russia; anti-Turkish campaign in the media worked to construct yet another 
‘public enemy’ shifting attention from Ukraine and the United States to a new 
‘face’. 
Some regions were potentially more affected than others by Russia's radical 
anti-Turkish measures. Tatarstan and Bashkortostan, two Turkic-speaking 
Muslim republics, have long worked on developing close ties with Turkey 
based on their ethnic, linguistic and religious proximity. In Tatarstan, Turkey 
accounts for a quarter of foreign direct investment amounting to $1.5bln. Ta-
tarstan has signed separate cooperation agreements with seven provinces of 
Turkey indicating the intensity of business and cultural links between these 
entities.40  Turkish companies have been among the key residents of Alabuga 
Special Economic Zone as well as major contributors to construction in Kazan 
and other places in the republic.41 For example, the Turkish company ODAK 
has been involved in the construction of such important projects as the Presi-
dential Palace in the Kremlin, Kul Sharif mosque, the Republican Supreme 
Court, and several centrally located shopping malls.42 In short, the business 
restrictions imposed from Moscow were potentially harmful to the Republi-
can economy and the relations with a long-term partner. Bashkortostan, an-
other republic with intensive economic links with Turkey (i.e., $300 million 
trade turnover and ninety one companies with Turkish investments), also 
faced a precarious situation in the new circumstances.43 Besides economic 
damage, the Russian Ministry of Culture also instructed them along with 
Sakha and Altai republican governments to end any contacts with Turksoy, 
Ankara-based organization uniting Turkic people, thereby striking at the cul-
tural autonomy of Turkic-speaking peoples of Russia. 
 In this delicate situation, the reaction of the Republican elites is indicative 
of the constraints they face and the remains of the freedom of action they 
might still enjoy in the current political environment. Most regional leaders 
 
40 Aleksandr Andreev et al., “Tatarstan i Turtsiia: poidut li 20 let biznes-druzhby ‘SU’ pod 
khvost?” Business-gazeta.ru, 26 November 2015. Accessed at: http://www.business-
gazeta.ru/article/146371/ 
41 Special economic zones (SEZ) in Russia provide tax preferences, special customs regime, re-
duced administrative barriers, simplified migration rules and other benefits to selected 
companies and are created by the Russian government as an instrument to attract for-
eign investments. Alabuga SEZ is one of twenty-eight special economic zones in Russia. 
42 Aleksandr Andreev et al., 2015. 
43 Egor Belov, “Bashkortostan i Turtsiia: chto budet dal’she?” Rbc.ru, 30 November 2015. Ac-
cessed at: http://ufa.rbc.ru/ufa/30/11/2015/565c37949a7947d1b346f5d7 
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took a ‘wait-and-see’ approach despite the negative economic consequences 
expected from the Kremlin’s anti-Turkish sanctions. Tatarstan's reaction was 
arguably most vocal but might not be generalizable to the rest of Russia's re-
gions; it has long been noted to have a special status comparable to the one 
enjoyed by Chechnya and its president Ramzan Kadyrov. For example, Chech-
nya and Tatarstan are the only two regions that still have bilateral treaties with 
Moscow. 
Still, this reaction is informative of public and private communication 
channels available to regional elites in their interaction with the federal cen-
ter. I don't quite understand this last point…In the tradition of Tatarstan’s first 
president Mintimer Shaimiev, the Republic’s current president Rustam Min-
nikhanov took a pragmatic and relatively bold stance that contradicted the 
emotionally charged anti-Turkish sentiment spreading across the country. His 
position was charted very carefully, with references to Putin’s own words: 
 “I can refer to what our president said, that Turkey is a friendly nation.. 
[…] For Tatars, the Turks are a brotherly people. We belong to the same 
language group and to the same religion. What the president said is a 
very serious support for us, because we have large Turkish investment 
projects. They have believed in our president.”44  
At the same time, pragmatic Minnikhanov openly admitted that foreign policy 
making is the prerogative of the federal government and noted, “we have to 
follow the line defined by our leadership.”45 Besides these public statements, 
Tatarstan's government, along with the leaders of other affected regions, pri-
vately lobbied Moscow to include Turkish companies working in the Republic 
in the list of companies excluded from sanctions and also to include Republi-
can companies in the list of Russian companies that could still hire Turkish 
citizens.46 Subsequently, the Russian Ministry of Labor worked out such a list 
 
44 “Sozhaleiia o Turtsii, Minnikhanov prizval..,” Regnum.ru, 29 January 2016. Accessed at: reg-
num.ru/news/polit/2067819.html 
45 Ibid. 
46 “Pravitel’stvo utverdilo..,” Vedomosti.ru, 24 December 2015. Accessed at: www.ve-
domosti.ru/politics/news/2015/12/24/622444-perechen-rossiiskih-kompanii-grazhdan-
turtsii 
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of fifty-three companies from thirteen regions allowed to hire Turkish citi-
zens.47 Nine companies working in Tatarstan were exempted from anti-Turk-
ish sanctions.   
Minnikhanov went even further in criticizing Russian government policies, 
especially the persistent anti-American propaganda campaign. “I am prepared 
to be friends with everybody who invests in Tatarstan,” he said. “Skin color, 
nationality, religion do not matter! They say that Americans do not like us. 
They built two factories here in our special economic zone and everything is 
fine, we work together well”.48 Such pragmatic statements by the republican 
leader went against the federal center’s intensely ideological and propagan-
distic policies and statements of the last few years. Arguably, many other re-
gional leaders could have joined Minnikhanov in such position; regional gov-
ernments have always been in the first line of absorbing the shocks and actual 
economic and social consequences of the federal policy (whether in the 1990s 
or in the 2010s). No wonder, regional expert Natalya Zubarevich has suggested 
recently that, “there is more common sense in the regions than in the White 
House or the Kremlin as well as more desire to live normally.”49  However, it is 
also clear that the governance system constructed in Russia incentivizes re-
gional authorities to fall in line with federal initiatives, at least publicly, rather 
than oppose them. Meanwhile, the recent rapprochement between Russia and 
Turkey proved Minnikhanov’s pragmatism right. After the Turkish president’s 
apology to Russia for shooting the plane, Russian-Turkish relations have been 
reinitiated with an August summit in St. Petersburg that signaled an end to 
belligerency between two nations. 
In the end, Putin’s recent foreign policy driven, arguably, by domestic con-
cerns for political legitimacy and regime maintenance, has with the help of 
intense propaganda campaign waged on Russia’s major TV channels, propped 
Putin’s own image as a strong leader defending Russia’s interests abroad.50 
 
47 Nikita Anisimov, “Turki ostanutsia v Tatarstane,” 25 December 2015. Accessed at: kazan-
first.ru/article/111968 
48 Valery Dzutsati, “Tatarstan’s President Defies Kremlin Efforts to Unite Russians against An-
other Common ‘Enemy,’” Eurasia Daily Monitor Volume, 13, no. 3. 
49 Natalya Zubarevich, “Ekonomiku nel’zia ugovorit’ televizorom,” RBC news, 11 August 2016. 
Accessed at: ok.ru/video/14682427889 
50 For a related discussion, see Alexei Arbatov, “Russia’s Foreign and Security Policy.” Accessed 
at: carnegie.ru/2016/06/21/russian-foreign-and-security-policy/j28d. Samuel Greene, 
“Domestic Sources of Foreign Policy in Russia: Why Moscow’s Shift to Confrontation with 
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Russia’s population however had to pay a hefty economic price for these poli-
cies as Russia’s economy plunged into recession undermined by low energy 
prices as well as economic sanctions from the West and those imposed by Rus-
sia against the West and Turkey.51 Dealing with economic and social conse-
quences of these policies is among the central everyday concerns for regional 
governors who had to work out various adaptation strategies, as described be-
low. 
Russia’s Faltering Economy: Response from the Regions 
Olga Golodets, Russia’s deputy prime minister on social affairs, admitted in 
the beginning of 2016 that the Russian population is rapidly sliding into pov-
erty.52  The number of people below the poverty line according to 2015 statis-
tics has grown at a record rate, by 3.1 million reaching 19.2 million people or 
over 13% of the entire population. The first signs of this new reality appeared 
in 2013 underscoring the fact that economic problems in the country are not 
simply the product of external factors but result from long-term structural im-
pediments to economic development.53 Ordinary Russians quickly cut spend-
ing and shifted into survival mode, familiar to many from the 1990s. Yet, as in 
the 1990s, local grievances are growing and popular protests, mostly motivated 
by economic concerns, are bubbling up across the country. In the face of de-
clining patriotic euphoria and despite the popularity gains for the Russian 
leadership, regional administrations have to be creative in addressing the 
growing economic and social problems in the context of a slumping economy.  
While most regions have been negatively affected by the economic crisis, 
there is a group of regions that shows positive dynamics in their revenues and 
other economic indicators in the last two years.  These, crisis-resilient regions 
 
Washington is Structural” (2016). Accessed at: moscowonthames.files.word-
press.com/2015/08/20130311-sgreene-ponars.pdf 
51 Vladimir Mau, "Between crises and sanctions: economic policy of the Russian Federation," 
Post-Soviet Affairs 32, no.4 (2016): 350-377. 
52 “Golodets priznala rezkoe obednenie rossiian,” Vedomosti.ru. 23 March 2016. Accessed at: 
www.vedomosti.ru/newsline/top/economics/news/2016/03/23/634774-golodets-
priznala-obednenie 
53 For a more detailed discussion, see Natalia Zubarevich, “Regional Social Expenditures: A 
Country of Contrasts,” (December 23, 2015). Russian Economic Developments, Moscow, 
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could be divided into three sub-groups: regions champions in oil and gas pro-
duction, regions that have benefitted from the government procurement in 
defense industries, and regions with large agricultural sectors that benefitted 
from import-substitution in the agriculture.54 Among the remainder of the re-
gions expanding budget deficits and growing rates of regional debt reached 2.4 
billion rubles by the beginning of 2015 and 2.68 billion by April 2016 demon-
strate the depth of economic decline.55 These conditions forced regional gov-
ernments to shift their priorities from growth and development to strategic 
retrenchment and cutting losses.  
The actual types of actions undertaken by regional authorities reflected rel-
ative strengths and weaknesses of the regions. Among the strategies employed 
by regional governments in response to worsening economic conditions are 
(1) regional lobbying of the federal center for more resources, (2) privatizing 
regional assets, (3) borrowing from commercial and state-controlled banks, 
and (4) cutting expenditures and optimizing the budget sector. As I discuss 
below, the first three strategies are not universally available to all regions as 
they depend on region’s existing economic assets, political connections in 
Moscow or financial situation. Furthermore, while the prevalence of the last 
strategy – cutting expenditures – has been limited in the lead up to 2018 pres-
idential elections, it is likely to increase after the election cycle.  These cuts are 
likely to place additional strain on governors’ relations with the regional pop-
ulation.   
Lobbying 
Lobbying has always been important in federal-regional relations, whether in 
relation to financial issues, cadre policy or any decisions of importance for re-
gional authorities that depend on the federal government.  Normally, regional 
governors are key players in this process and, it has been long observed that 
they differ tremendously in their lobbying capacities. In the past few years the 
most consistent top three lobbyists among regional leaders are Sergei Sobya-
nin (Moscow mayor), Rustem Minnikhanov (President of Tatarstan), and 
Ramzan Kadyrov (Head of Chechnya). All three have secured regional control 
over critical assets that alleviate pressures due to the economic crisis.  
Chechnya had long benefitted from massive financial inflows from the fed-
eral center but has recently seen a drastic reduction in federal financial help 
 
54 Tatiana Zamakhina, “Samye ustoichivye,” Rossiiskaia gazeta, 29 February 2016. Accessed at: 
rg.ru/2016/02/29/nazvany-naibolee-ustojchivye-k-krizisu-regiony-rossii.html 
55Aleksandra Prokopenko, “Regiony mogut poluchit’ dostup k kreditam s plavaiushchei 
protsentnoj  stavkoi,” Vedomosti July 15, 2016. 
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as the program for socio-economic development of Chechnya ended in 2012. 
Kadyrov’s success in establishing regional control over the oil industry on the 
Chechen territory in 2016 is the most recent example of successful lobbying at 
the very top levels of the Russian government. Until 2016 Chechen oil was pro-
duced exclusively by Rosneft through its subsidiary Grozneftekhim. Another 
state-owned company, Chechenneftekhimprom, also managed by Rosneft, 
owns all land rights for oil producing territories in Chechnya and controls ad-
ditional infrastructure related to oil production and oil-refining. In December 
2015 Putin signed an order initiating the transfer to Chechnya of all assets as-
sociated with Chechenneftekhimprom, a process that was completed in 
March 2016.  
Kadyrov argued that Rosneft underutilized Chechenneftekhimprom assets. 
Since the amount of oil produced in the republic has been dwindling due to 
field depletion, Kadyrov long advocated that Rosneft and the Russian govern-
ment build an oil refinery in Chechnya.  Although these efforts culminated in 
a promise to build one, the project has never been realized. Recently the Che-
chen government announced plans to use the land controlled by 
Chechenneftekhimprom to build a factory manufacturing lithium-ion batter-
ies.56  This regional success is quite unprecedented given the earlier pattern of 
property relations between the center and the regions under Putin and is re-
flective of Kremlin’s dependence on Kadyrov personally. His role in stabilizing 
and rebuilding war-torn Chechnya has made him into a leader hard to replace, 
lest new instability ensues in the region. His public support and loyalty for 
Putin are no doubt also appreciated. 
Reflecting the depth of Russia’s economic crisis, federal budget cuts have 
even touched planned international mega-events such as the 2018 world foot-
ball championship.  From the extraordinary spending on Winter Olympics in 
Sochi, we know that the Russian government does take these sports events 
very seriously.  Yet the planned federal spending related to the World Cup has 
been slashed by 44 billion rubles,57 which means that many regions that 
planned for additional investments into infrastructure will not receive the 
funds. This also means that regional authorities have to use their lobbying po-
tential to defend their regional infrastructural investments. Some regions such 
as Nizhegorodskaya oblast were able to keep federal transfers on building the 
 
56 Liz Fuller, “Chechnya to Acquire Federal Oil Industry Assets On Its Territory,” RFE RL, 6 Jan-
uary 2016. Accessed at: www.rferl.org/content/caucasus-report-chechnya-oil-refin-
ery/27472661.html 
57 The 2018 World Cup games will be held in eleven Russian cities including regional capitals 
such as Samara, Kazan, Saransk, Volgograd, Kaliningrad, Nizhny Novgorod, Yekaterin-
burg, and Rostov-na-Donu.   http://россия2018.рф 
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subway system.  In the context of preparing for the world cup Nizhnii Novgo-
rod is planning to receive around 2 billion rubles from the federal center to 
finance additional metro stations in the city. Other regions had to postpone 
such plans, such as Sverdlovskaia oblast, where the plans for federal support 
in building additional subway lines in connection with the world cup were 
scrapped. The differing lobbying capacities of the regional governors of these 
regions are cited as one of plausible reasons for such divergences. 
Selling Off Assets 
Selling off regionally controlled assets is another strategy that regions can un-
dertake confronting financial and economic pressures.  Of course, this strategy 
is available only to those regional governments that control sizable assets. The 
government of the Republic of Tatarstan, for example, is a case in point. Re-
cently, in parallel with the Russian government’s plans of massive privatiza-
tion, Tatarstan’s government has announced the privatization of government-
held shares in Nizhnekamskneftekhim (24.99%), Taneko (9%) and Tatneft. 
On March 17th 2016, Tatneft purchased Taneco and Nizhnekamskneftekhim 
shares from the government, becoming an exclusive owner of Taneco oil re-
finery and almost of a quarter-owner of Nizhnekamsk based petrochemical 
complex.  It is still not clear how the Republican government, will use the 49.7 
billion rubles received from the sale, although the declared purpose was a 
more effective use of capital. Tatarstan does have massive debts but they are 
mostly long term budget credits financed at very low interest rates.  So, it is 
unlikely that these funds would be used to fill the Republican budget holes. 
Repaying this debt is not the Republican government’s utmost priority right 
now. Two competing explanations are linked to either financing a megapro-
ject (for example, the announced plans to build Kama oil cluster); or preparing 
for the securitization of assets abroad in the face of worsening economic envi-
ronment.58 Khanty-Mansi autonomous oblast and Belgorod oblast are two 
other examples of regions planning to privatize some of their region-con-
trolled assets. In the first case, the government wants to privatize an energy 
company and a road-building company.  In the second case, the government 
wants to sell some of its assets in the agricultural industry (two dairy compa-
nies).59  
Regions that cannot rely on vast economic assets but still have to deal with 
 
58 Aleksei Brusnytsin et al., “Korolevskaia svad’ba..” Business-gazeta.ru, 21 March 2016. Accessed 
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budget deficits and high levels of indebtedness have to use other ways to im-
prove their budget balances: smaller-scale privatization schemes, private fi-
nancial institutions for raising more funds and various ‘belt-tightening’ tech-
niques. Thus, in effort to balance its budget Lipetsk authorities undertook an 
inventory of all the buildings and physical assets not used for public goods pro-
vision and plan them for privatization.  The authorities also plan to raise indi-
vidual income and individual property tax rates as well as excises on oil prod-
ucts.   
Borrowing 
To finance their expenditures that have increased in response to May 2012 
presidential decrees, regions had to rely on borrowing from commercial 
banks.  Between 2013-2015 the volume of bank credits taken by regional gov-
ernments has grown by 40 percent. In 2014, the federal government responded 
to these financial problems by doubling the amount of budget loans extended 
to the regions. It maintained the same level of financial support in 2015.  
Budget loans are given on much more favorable conditions of 0.1 percent an-
nual interest rate for three years and the criteria for receiving these loans have 
been simplified in 2015 allowing the regions to restructure their debt to the 
banks.  Consequently, in 2015 the rate of growth of regional commercial credits 
has diminished considerably. Still, regions with very high levels of commercial 
debt do not always have access to this source of financing. In 2016 for example 
the government planned to distribute 310 billion rubles in budget loans, while 
the regions’ outstanding payments owed to commercial banks amount to 500 
billion rubles.60 Therefore, regions continue to borrow from commercial banks 
to pay their debts and fund their deficit spending. Thus, Amur oblast has debt 
of 30 billion rubles and its 2016 budget is short by an additional 844 million 
rubles.  It is expected to pay back 18.5 billion rubles of its debt but to enable 
that payment as well as to finance its deficit the regional government plans to 
borrow additional 18.9 billion rubles from commercial banks.61 Recent report 
by ACRA consultants specifically noted six regions with the level of indebted-
ness over 70 percent of regional revenues including Ivanovskaia, Ko-
stromskaia, and Omskaia oblasts and the Republics of Khakasia, Mordovia and 
Mari-El.62 
In short, regional borrowing from the federal center and the commercial 
 
60 Prokopenko 2016. 
61 “Biudzhet Priamur’ia -2016,” Regnum.ru, 25 October 2015. Accessed at: regnum.ru/news/econ-
omy/1998295.html 
62 “Regiony. Biudzhety,” ACRA, 23 March 2016. Accessed at: http://www.acra-ratings.ru/stor-
age/comment/13/20160323_RSSEA.pdf 
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banks has been rising in the last few years reflecting the financial strain result-
ing from the combination of Russia’s economic problems and the increased 
financial burden on the regions associated with Putin’s 2012 decrees. Although 
the federal center has shown the awareness of these issues, no long-term solu-
tion has been found reflecting Russia’s broader, institutional and political 
problems. Therefore, this short-term strategy of borrowing and preventing re-
gional defaults on one-to-one basis are likely to continue in the short to me-
dium-term future creating long-term fiscal problems.  
Cutting 
Cutting expenditures appears as an inevitable strategy in such circumstances 
but the political imperatives associated with 2016 parliamentary elections and 
2018 presidential elections mean that regional authorities have to be ex-
tremely cautious as what expenditures are cut.  Given that in some regions 
around 70% of regional spending is social in nature, the margins for expendi-
ture cuts are extremely limited which explains continuing borrowing and 
growing regional indebtedness.  Still, analysts have noted that starting in 2014 
some regions decreased their spending on education, culture and healthcare. 
Utilities is another sector that has suffered from a gradual diminishing of 
spending on utilities (from about 16% of all regional expenditures in 2008, to 
11% in 2011 and 7.5 % in 2015).63 
‘Optimization’ of the bureaucratic apparatus is another ‘code’ word pro-
moted by the Kremlin in relation to a more effective use of available resources.  
During 2013-2014 optimization was centered mostly on the education and 
healthcare spheres.  Recently, it affected the state officials as well as the Min-
istry of Internal Affairs and the Ministry of Emergency Situations embarked on 
cutting their apparatuses. Going along with these trends several regions de-
cided to cut regional bureaucracy or their salary levels, including for example 
the Republic of Mordovia that aims to get rid of 10% of its regional bureau-
cratic apparatus in 2016 and Primorski krai that undertook a 10% salary cut for 
regional bureaucrats and discontinues some of the positions in the regional 
bureaucracy.  
Finally, one of the key items not discussed above is concerned with the 
measures the regional governments can undertake to stimulate the local rev-
enue basis. This is of course the preferred strategy from the point of view of 
 
63 “Regiony. Biudzhety,” ACRA, 2 March 2016. Accessed at:  
http://www.acra-ratings.ru/storage/comment/6/20150302_RSSAP.pdf 
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the federal center. In relation to that, the federal government advanced addi-
tional support for small and medium size businesses, an initiative quickly in-
tegrated into regional agendas as well. One measure of such support initiated 
by the Russian government was to allow domestic small and medium sized 
businesses access government procurement.  From 2015 state-owned compa-
nies were mandated to allocate quotas to buy goods and services from small 
and medium size enterprises. In March 2016 these quotas were increased from 
10% to 15%.  The impact of these administrative measures is not very promis-
ing. Without serious improvements in business environment, strengthening 
the rule of law and property rights, easing the regulatory framework and re-
moving the red tape it is unlikely that the small and medium size businesses 
would become the backbone of the Russian economy. Instead, the resources 
from government procurement could be channeled to well-connected firms 
and companies that are interested in maintaining high barriers to entry.   
Conclusion 
Driven by forces out of their control, Russia’s governors in the last few years have 
found themselves in the tricky spot between Scylla and Charybdis. Though most 
of them go through regional elections that demonstrate overwhelming sup-
port (if carefully manufactured with the use of administrative resources) from 
voters, their fate depends primarily on the federal center. They have to deliver 
social stability and proper voting results expected by the Kremlin but the fi-
nancial support they relied upon in the 2000s is not there anymore. They have 
to keep up regional economies and employment but have an added request of 
promoting patriotism and traditional values. They have been instructed to 
fight corruption in their regions but could easily fall victim to corruption 
charges themselves.  
The increased vulnerability of gubernatorial positions in Russia resulting 
from the combination of factors described above has been reflected in unprec-
edented arrests of sitting governors, charged with corruption and criminal ac-
tivities. The most recent cases of cadre reshuffle undertaken in Yaroslavl, Ki-
rov, Kaliningrad and Sevastopol and appointment of security service officers 
in these positions also confirms this trend, sending a strong signal to regional 
governors to tow the Kremlin line. Given how well the governors have been 
integrated into the vertical of power, however, these vulnerabilities might be 
exposing the more general weaknesses of Russia’s political system that has 
stood on the path of legitimizing the power system through identity politics 
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rather than a genuine search for social and economic progress and develop-
ment. 
Ultimately, the short-term solutions to Russia’s outstanding problems seem 
to create new problems evidenced most clearly by the economic effects of 
Putin’s foreign policy. At the regional level elites are faced with difficult policy 
dilemmas as well. Commercial borrowing to address regional shortages leads 
to their further indebtedness and undercuts their future developmental po-
tential; but cutting expenditures carries the risk of political and social destabi-
lization in the region. Fighting corruption – both nationally and regionally – 
is imperative to cut the waste in the system but it also endangers the stability 
of the elites and regional political machines that are responsible for delivering 
voting results. Promoting patriotism and traditional values distracts attention 
for a while, but is not a good recipe for dealing with the rising tides of discon-
tent driven by economic and social degradation and mismanagement. Navi-
gating from one storm into another and a high attrition rate for the governors 
is the only predictable future scenario in such circumstances unless major 
structural changes are underway.   
 
Appendix  
TABLE 1 Gubernatorial Elections, 2012-2015  [AQ: The table will fine-tuned and better positioned]  
 
Year Region  Winner Party Winner Vote Second-best candidate Vote Turnout 
2012 Amurskiaia oblast  Kozhemyako UR 77.28 9.99 36.79 
Belgorodskaia oblast  Savchenko UR 77.64 12.43 59.47 
Brianskaia obstast  Denin** UR 65.22 30.83 46.94 
Novgorodskaia oblast  Mitin UR 75.95 10.63 42.8 
Ryazan oblast  Kovalev UR 64.43 21.92 43.51 
2013 Khakassia republic  Zimin UR 63.41 9.94 37.84 
Zabaikal krai  Ilkovskii JR 71.63 11.74 35.47 
Khabarovsk krai  Shport UR 63.92 19.14 33.89 
Vladimirskaia oblast  Orlova UR 74.73 10.64 28.51 
Magadan oblast  Pechenii UR 73.11 14.84 32.28 
Moscow oblast  Vorobiov UR 78.94 7.72 38.58 
Moscow city  Sobianin UR 51.37 27.24 32.03 
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Chukotskii okrug  Kopin UR 64.44 9.8 64.44 
2014 Stavropol krai  Vladimirov UR 84.22 6.1 47.88 
Ivanovo oblast  Kon'kov UR 80.32 7.83 36.6 
Komi republic  Gaizer** UR 78.97 6.85 58.95 
Kirov oblast  Belyh** UR 69.98 15.99 36.25 
Chelyabinsk oblast  Dubrovskii UR 86.37 5.25 42.51 
Altai republic  Berdnikov UR 50.63 36.44 60.14 
Kurgan oblast  Kokorin UR 84.87 8.07 39.77 
Udmurtia republic  Soloviov UR 84.84 7.65 43.09 
Neneckii okrug  Koshin UR 76.7 7.67 44.3 
Oriol oblast  Potomskii KPRF 89.17 3.74 62.65 
Pskov oblast  Turchak UR 78.36 11.22 37.9 
Voronezh oblast  Gordeev UR 88.75 7.69 56.21 
Novosibirsk oblast  Gorodetskii UR 64.97 18.86 29.83 
Volgogradskaia oblast  Bocharov UR 88.49 4.45 38.72 
Sakha - iakutia republic  Borisov UR 58.79 29.49 55.39 
Murmanskaia oblast  Kovtun UR 64.69 11.29 31.02 
Kalmikia republic  Orlov UR 82.89 8.26 61.43 
Krasnoiarsk krai  Tolokonskii UR 63.3 14.01 31.26 
Lipetsk oblast   Koroliov UR 81.83 7.46 46.79 
Kursk oblast  Mikhailov UR 66.81 11.73 38.97 
Tyumen oblast  Iakushev UR 86.56 6.21 58.34 
Orenburg oblast  Berg UR 80.28 7.37 44.12 
Vologda oblast  Kuvshinnikov UR 64.69 18.04 29.72 
Bashkortostan republic  Khamitov UR 81.71 10.13 74.88 
Nizhegorodskaia oblast  Shantsev UR 86.93 5.65 54.49 
Primorskii krai  Miklushevskii UR 77.43 12.67 39.65 
Samara oblast  Merkushkin UR 91.35 3.95 56.9 
Sankt-peterburg city  Poltavchenko UR 79.3 9.37 39.13 
Altaiskii krai  Karlin UR 72.97 11.22 34.38 
Astrakhan oblast  Zhilkin UR 75.28 16.22 36.95 
2015 
 
Briansk oblast  Bogomaz UR 79.96 9.61 57.43 
Mari el republic  Markelov UR 56.86 32.31 47.09 
Evreiskaia oblast  Levinthal UR 75.42 14.37 31.87 
Tatarstan republic  Minninkhanov UR 94.4 2.56 84.21 
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Sakhalin oblast  Kozhemyako UR 67.8 20.27 37.59 
Amur oblast   Kozlov UR 50.64 28.3 33.54 
Kemerovo oblast  Tuleev UR 93.54 1.78 92.13 
Krasnodar krai  Kondratiev UR 83.64 7.88 42 
Leningrad oblast  Drozdenko UR 82.1 6.98 44.52 
Kamchatkii krai   Ilyukhin UR 75.48 8.14 31.88 
Irkutskaia oblast  Levchenko* KPRF 56.39 41.46 37.2 
Omsk oblast  Nazarov UR 60.02 28.5 33.78 
Kostroma oblast   Sitnikov UR 65.62 21.43 35.79 
Smolensk oblast  Ostrovskii  LDPR 65.18 12.42 28.77 
Arkhangelskaia oblast  Orlov UR 53.25 19.22 20.99 
Penza oblast  Belozertsev UR 86.04 7.75 62.66 
Rostov oblast  Golubev UR 78.21 11.67 48.51 
Tambov oblast   Nikitin UR 85.47 6.2 57.8 
Kaluga oblast  Artamonov UR 66.86 12.16 36.28 
Chuvashskaia oblast  Ignatiev UR 65.54 14.73 58.65 
Kaliningrad oblast  Tsukanov UR 70.41 10.22 39.59 
Notes. * - non-incumbent candidate; ** - governor fired and criminal proceedings initiated.   
 
 
